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Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis has not come without its fair share of 
criticism.  Much ado about Minsky’s endogenous business cycle theory stems from a 
model where boom-time profit opportunities indelibly encourage firms to finance 
investment by leveraging their fixed capital assets against their internal liquidity.  
Opposition to Minsky often points to two distinct circumstances that might discourage 
the external finance of investment: a rise in effective demand and increasing risk.  A rise 
in effective demand can increase the retained earnings of a firm providing more capital to 
internally finance investment and investment financed from retained earning is less risky 
than investment financed with debt.  This has fueled criticism of Minsky’s framework as 
having controversial assumptions that discourage rather than encourage financial 
instability.   
  This paper examines Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis from a savings 
and debt point of view in order to determine whether or not Minsky’s financial crisis 
theory holds up to its critics.  It looks at the peculiar role of foreign savings in creating an 
incentive for financialization and how that engenders financial instability.  Moreover, I 
hope to display a theoretical argument that unifies much of the criticism of Minsky with 
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 The recent financial crises of the United States and Europe have brought Hyman 
Minsky’s landmark ideas of endogenous financial instability to the forefront of many 
academic and professional discussions.  The model of rising debt to equity ratio during an 
economic boom period that Minsky pioneered in his Financial Instability Hypothesis has 
regained traction after the housing crisis in the US and sovereign debt crises in the 
European Union have revealed a period of economic growth buttressed by household, 
firm and government debt finance.   
 My interest in Minsky is a product of his rebirth in the media as financial markets 
showed considerable signs of weakness and fragility in the fall of 2007.  An article in the 
Wall Street Journal by Justin Lahart (August, 2007) declared the financial market turmoil 
in late 2007 as Minsky’s moment to shine after years of obscurity.  In 2008, an article in 
The New Yorker by John Cassidy aptly titled “The Minsky Moment” lauds the prescience 
of this little known economist whose discussion of endogenous financial instability is 
changing the discussion from the political wrangling over tax-cuts and stimulus to 
financial sector reform.  The newfound interest in Minsky and his ideas on endogenous 
financial instability are what motivated this paper. 
Nowadays the discussion of Minsky finally having his ‘moment’ does not 
eliminate an ongoing debate that has criticized the theoretical integrity of Minsky’s 
contributions to the theory of endogenous business cycles.  Some of Minsky’s most 
staunch supporters in the Post-Keynesian school of economics have criticized his 
Financial Instability Hypothesis as having “an obvious missing macroeconomic link in 
his formal exposition” (Lavoie and Seccareccia, 2001, p. 77 and 83) and Minsky’s 
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relationship between economic growth and rising leverage ratios displays some 
“controversial assumption” (Delli Gatti and Gallegati, 1990, p. 368).  Most of the 
controversy that has encircled Minsky’s theories on financial fragility comes from a 
perceived lack of integration with Kalecki’s Principle of Increasing Risk (1937), which 
on the surface appears to contradict Minsky Financial Instability Hypothesis.  Minsky’s 
theory states that economic growth and recent success on business ventures promotes 
greater risk taking by leveraging the fixed capital assets of business against its internal 
liquidity in order to exploit profits opportunities.  However, Kalecki explains that higher 
leverage ratios (what he calls the gearing ratio) increase the marginal risk of investment 
by increasing the danger of substantial losses on bad business ventures, it compromises 
their ability to borrow at lower risk premiums and it increases the illiquidity of the firm as 
more financial capital is tied up in fixed business capital.  During economic growth, 
critics of Minsky contend that higher effective demand conditions will increase the 
retained earnings of the firm and investment finance will come for the entrepreneurs’ 
own capital rather than external finance.  Therefore, economic growth can occur without 
necessitating an aggregate increase in the proportion of debt to equity of a national 
economy. 
A unification theory that integrates the ideas of both Minsky and Kalecki might 
put to rest some of the controversy behind Minsky’s theory on financial fragility.  
However, in order to reconcile this idea of a firm’s assets rising proportionately greater 
than equity without increasing the perceived risk of the firm runs into a seemingly 
indelible contradiction.  Economic growth fueled by an increase in effective demand 
boosts the level of business savings and discourages the Minsky process from happening.  
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Firms that possess large amounts of entrepreneurial capital are likely to prefer internal 
finance of investment due to the increasing risks associated with external finance.   
Approaching the Minsky process from a savings and debt point of view unveils 
some important insight to the theoretical arguments the buttresses his endogenous 
business cycle theory and what it might mean for financial sector stability.   In a world 
that is open to a high volume of financial capital that moves between countries, total 
outside savings (foreign savings plus domestic savings) must be absorbed into domestic 
capital markets as liabilities raising the proportion of an economy’s total assets to equity.  
In order for this to happen total outside savings must be relatively more elastic than 
business savings with respect to economic growth.  This runs contrary to most studies 
where domestic outside savings appears to be inelastic.  There must be something about 
foreign savings, the inflow of external capital from foreign financial markets, which 
increases the elasticity of outside savings to business savings.  Therefore, the Minsky 
process must not only be examined through the filter of a closed economy, but it must be 
opened up to allow for external capital flows. 
 Furthermore, equity markets can absorb large amounts of capital without 
increasing the proportion of business capital to equity of the firm.  Large firms can issue 
new shares in equity markets to raise money for investment as an alternative to debt 
finance.  As total outside savings is merged with equity the market price of shares can 
surge creating an incentive for firms to issue new shares.  During periods when investor 
confidence is high, share capital will have a tendency to rise proportionately greater than 
replacement value of the existing capital assets of the firm effectively increasing the 
firm’s degree of capitalization.  The issuance of new shares is not necessarily the result of 
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a rising demand for fixed capital assets as it is intended, but rather an increase in the 
demand for financial assets.  The ability to earn capital gains on these assets motivates 
the financialization of firm diverting capital from productive investment to financial 
investment.   As we will see, Jan Toporowski’s theory of capital market inflation will 
play an important role in this shift to financial capitalism. 
 It is my belief that the conflict that underscores Minsky and Kalecki can be 
reconciled by the role total outside savings plays on the financialization of firms.  
Financial instability arises as the ratio of share capital to retained earnings increases as a 
result of financialization.  In effect, the capital market liabilities are increasing relative to 
liquid assets.  However, the rise in financial fragility is concealed by the peculiar role 
share capital plays as financial capital.  Share capital much like debt is a capital market 
liability, but it is designated as a type of entrepreneurial capital.  This can overstate the 
financial stability of a firm since they often use the ratio of debt to equity to measure their 
financial integrity essentially ignoring the inter-indebtedness of businesses.  Moreover, 
with financialization there is a tendency for marginal rate of profit to fall in future 
periods.  The dangers associated with unexpected excess capacity and the ability to earn 
capital gains on financial assets act to slow real fixed investment.  A portion of 
productive investment is replaced by financial investment translating to a fall in the 
marginal rate of profit in future periods.  
 The paper begins with a detailed description of the Minsky process.  I review 
Minsky’s work on investment fluctuations and the determination of profits in an 
economy.  I then turn my attention to Minsky’s analysis of the cash-flow-to-payment 
mechanism in an economy and the various financing units that permeate different periods 
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in the business cycle.  I end the chapter by emphasizing the conflict that arises when 
critiques of Minsky look to reconcile the Financial Instability Hypothesis with the 
Kaleckian analytics.   
 I begin Chapter 2 by reexamining the Minsky process from a savings and debt 
standpoint.  It compares the elasticity of domestic outside savings with respect a change 
in real capital accumulation in a closed economy under the conditions of a rising gearing 
ratio and a constant or falling gearing ratio.  Section 2.01 delves a bit deeper into the 
elasticities of different types of domestic outside savings and foreign savings.  By 
introducing foreign savings I make the transition from a closed economy to an open 
economy.  In particular, attention is paid to economies that rely heavily on imports and/or 
have relative weak domestic capital markets so their dependence on foreign capital 
markets for domestic finance exaggerates the impact of foreign savings on the elasticity 
of total outside savings.   Section 2.02 examines how total outside savings impacts firms 
of differing size within a national economy.  Here I aim to see how total outside savings 
is distributed among firms of different sizes and how financing constraints influence the 
position of various firms.   I introduce how equity markets impact investment and what 
that might mean for financial stability, i.e. how elastic foreign savings can lead to the 
financialization of joint stock companies.  Finally, section 2.03 reveals the destabilizing 
effects of financialization.  I argue that financialization lowers the marginal rate of profit 
overtime that eventually leads to a fall in real fixed investment and increasing financial 
instability.  Moreover, here is where I unify Minsky with Kalecki via the peculiar nature 





Chapter I. Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis  
For Minsky, the ability to finance current output and investment using various 
debt instruments leaves a legacy of past and current liabilities.  The various structures of 
cash flows yield profits from operations, spur investment decisions and administer to 
existing or inherited liabilities.  It is the past residue of existing debt obligations, the 
firm’s ability to meet those obligations today and the fundamental uncertainty associated 
with meeting future obligations with the acquisition of new assets that breeds from within 
financial instability. 
The endogenous movement from financial robustness to fragility is in a large part 
due to profit opportunities associated with relatively serene times that change the overall 
sentiment of an economy from passive to euphoric.  This moves the economy from 
predominately internally financed investment to externally financed investment on a 
wave of speculative behavior.  Margins of safety from borrowers and lenders are 
diminished as financing units move to more leveraged positions increasing their debt-to-
earnings ratios.  As an increasing number of firms pursue speculative financing 
arrangements where short-term debtors hold long-term assets in search for profit 
opportunities, they become vulnerable to any increase in interest rates.  A rise in interest 
rates makes liability payments more expensive.  The most leveraged firms will be among 
the first to require additional loans to simply meet their interest payments on outstanding 
debt obligations.  Financial institutions will look to clean up their balance sheets of 
excessive risk and the margins of safety for lenders will rise.  As defaults become more 
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prevalent due to tighter credit standards a vicious cycle of illiquidity, massive debts-to-
earning ratios and falling capital asset prices trigger a financial crisis.   
The brief summarization of a Minskyan crisis just brought forth is hardly 
satisfactory to make the transition from a closed economy to an open economy.  
Therefore, there are three important features of Minsky’s economic theory that justify 
further elucidation: (1) how do fluctuations in investment affect the prospective yields i.e. 
profits and (2) how do the cash-flow-to-payment of the various financing units 
(households, firms and financial institution) engender financial instability. 
 
Section 1.01 Investment fluctuations and expected profits 
Profits, in Minsky’s mind, are the root cause of financial instability that is built 
into the capitalist economy itself: 
[T]he pattern of interest rates (short-term rates being significantly lower than 
long-term rates) are such that profits can be made by intruding speculative 
arrangements…Profit opportunities within a robust financial structure make the 
shift from robustness to fragility an endogenous phenomenon (Minsky, 1986, p. 
234).   
 
In essence, profits are incomes or cash flows from operations less payments on existing 
liabilities, dividends, taxes, and the costs of doing business.  They are determined by 
investment and consumption patterns, which are, in turn, financed by internal (retained 
earnings) and external funds (borrowing).  Therefore, any decrease in financing will lead 
to lower investment activity translating to a fall in the rate of profit and a greater 
likelihood of not meeting past debt obligations.   Since the level of investment is what 
inevitably determines the level of profits in an economy, it is important to understand 
what determines the level of investment or the supply and demand for investment.   
	  
8	  
A Minsky crisis is grounded in the analysis of two sets of prices that permeate 
different time horizons: the supply price of investment or the price of current output that 
pervades the profit expectations of the short run; and the demand for investment or the 
price of capital assets that pervade the profit expectations of the long run (Minsky, 1982, 
p. 102).  Decisions to utilize existing capacity in order to produce either consumption 
output or investment output are derived by the prospective yields businesses expect to 
earn in the short-run.  Conversely, the price of capital assets is a function of future profit 
flows and liquidity preferences; that is, the expected profitability of capital assets and the 
uncertainty that is bound to money or money-like assets.  These decisions are based on 
the prospective yields an investment good are expected to earn over a lifetime.  Let us 
first examine the supply price of investment. 
Aggregate demand (consumption and investment demand) largely determines the 
level of output and employment in an economy.  Consumer demand directs businesses to 
utilize or lie idle their existing capacity.  When consumer confidence is high and their 
decisions to spend on consumption increase, producer confidence increases as inventories 
fall and production is ramped up.  The marginal profitability of existing capital increases 
as capital becomes increasingly scarce due to the increase in prospective yields.  The 
supply price of output (albeit consumption output or investment output) is estimated from 
the cost of production plus markups on a technologically determined labor cost in the 
short-term time horizon.  The supply price of investment is what Keynes defined as an 
assets replacement cost.  Minsky interpreted the replacement cost of a capital asset “as a 
schedule in which higher demand prices for capital assets will yield greater output of 
investment goods” (ibid, p. 95).  Provided that prices and wages are relatively sticky in 
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the short-run, the supply price of investment ought to be fairly stable during the relevant 
time horizon.  Essentially, the supply price of investment is determined by the current 
utilization of existing capacity, which is in turn determined by the aggregate demand 
condition in the near term.  Conversely, the demand price for capital assets is a decision 
to increase existing capacity and that implores long-term considerations.  Let us now turn 
our attention to the demand price of investment. 
Capital assets are valuable only because they are expected to earn profits.  The 
idea behind the profitability of capital is not some abstraction about the marginal 
productivity of capital, but (as briefly mentioned above) it is the relative scarcity of 
capital that makes it profitable.  Keynes says,  
It is much preferable to speak of capital as having a yield over the course of its 
life in excess of its original cost, than as being productive.  For the only reason 
why an asset offers a prospect of yielding during its life services having an 
aggregate value greater than its initial supply price is because it is scarce (Keynes, 
1936, p. 213). 
   
When capital is sitting idle it has not lost its productivity in the physical sense, it is 
merely over abundant as lackluster demand conditions lead to excess capacity.  However, 
as aggregate demand conditions improve, the existing stock of capital assets become 
increasingly scarce and the capitalization of these assets are realized.  Where current 
productive capabilities are determined by the existing level of the capital stock in a 
shorter time-horizon, the decision to increase the stock of capital assets is undertaken in a 
longer time-horizon to address the issues of scarcity when production is near full-
capacity.   
Since the decision to invest in capital assets is determined in the current period, 
then businesses must expect the additional capital asset to provide a yield above its cost 
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over the lifetime of the asset.  In other words, decisions to increase the stock of capital 
assets is dependent on the confidence of the producer that it will be profitable in future 
periods of production.  Hence the current price of capital assets, much like financial 
assets, are the income cash flows of the asset over the life of the assets less its carrying 
cost plus a liquidity premium (ibid, p. 226).  The income is the expected yields of the 
assets or cash flows it is intended to produce to the owner of the asset; the carrying cost 
of the asset is the cash flow that is necessary to make cash payments on outstanding 
liabilities (or simply the opportunity cost of owning other assets); and the liquidity 
premium is the cash flow that is implicitly found in the asset pertaining to its ease of 
disposal and subsequent transformation into money.   
The liquidity premium is determined by the relative price risk of the asset (the 
certainty of the value of an asset) and the transaction cost of converting the asset to 
money.   The more liquid the asset the more it behaves like money (the ‘moneyness’ of 
these assets have greater certainty in value and low transaction cost).  An increase or 
decrease in the liquidity premium placed on money like assets will have a contradictory 
effect on the price of more illiquid assets.  Therefore, the quantity of money must play a 
role in the determination of the price of capital assets since a rise in the quantity of 
money will supply an abundance of liquidity in an economy.  
Aside from the capitalization of expected profits determining the price of capital 
assets, the money supply acts as an upward impetus in similar respects.  Minsky explains 
that “in determining asset prices, the fixed point is that the price of a dollar is a dollar, 
one dollar is like another, and each dollar in existence supplies liquidity.  When…the 
dollar is plentiful relative to the stock of assets, then the price of assets will be high” 
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(Minsky, 2008, p. 202).  How is this so?  Minsky follows Keynes’ lead when he describes 
this phenomenon: if the money-rate of interest falls relative to that of other assets and to 
the carrying cost of those assets, then the liquidity premium must decrease for money and 
money-like assets; this has the tendency to increase the price of capital assets that cash 
flow profits and increase the liabilities that cash-flow cash payments (Minsky, 1975, p. 
90).  Therefore, during normal times the price of a capital asset increases with the 
quantity of money.   There are two important caveats that accompany this statement:  this 
is not the case when an economy has fallen into the clutches of a liquidity trap (when 
money demand becomes infinitely elastic) and high inflation (hyperinflation) corrodes 
any value money might have as an insurance policy.   
The level or pace of investment in an economy is directly related to the demand 
and supply for investment where the demand price for capital assets is equal to the supply 
price of investment.  According to Keynes the marginal profitability of capital is equal 
“to the rate of discount which would make the present value of the series of annuities 
given by the returns expected from the capital-asset during its life just equal to its supply 
price” (Keynes, 1936, p. 135).  In essence, the pace of investment is directly related to the 
changes in the expected cash flows on capital assets i.e. the capitalization of prospective 
yields, changes in the cash flows on debts i.e. the interest rate, or a feedback mechanism 
resulting from a combination of both.  From this it is clear, since the supply of investment 
is assumed to remain relatively stable in the short term, then it must be that the price of 
capital assets influences the fluctuations in investment.  This is not surprising given that 
the decision to increase the current stock of capital is based on today’s confidence of the 
uncertain realities of tomorrow.   
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It would be short sighted to simply believe the pace of investment is merely the 
equality between the demand and supply prices of investment.  This would only hold in a 
world where financing is not relevant.  However, the role finance plays in the pace of 
investment is profoundly significant.  Firms not only use retained earning to internally 
finance investment, but they externally finance investment by borrowing.   
 When expected profits are capitalized justifying past investment decisions, the 
demand for capital assets rise leading a firm to determine whether an investment decision 
is worth undertaking.  At this point the demand for capital assets is greater than the 
supply price of capital assets and the subsequent level of investment is contingent on 
three factors: (1) the level of retained earning or gross profits available for internally 
financed investment, (2) the level of risk both borrowers and lenders are willing to endure 
in their liability and asset structure, and (3) the current utilization of capacity.   
Investment out of gross profits will yield a level of investment that is dependent 
on the amount of entrepreneurial capital or the internal accumulation of reserves available 
to the firm for the purchase of fixed capital assets.  If retained earnings increase with the 
rate of profit, then investment might look more desirable as prospective yields of 
additional fixed capital assets rise.  An increase in real fixed investment from retained 
earnings increases the capital of a firm available as collateral for external financing.  
Therefore, at certain point a rise in the retained earnings of a firm will increase the 
desirability of investment to a point where actual investment occurs.   
Given the sentiment of the investing firm and the prospective yields associated 
with additional investment, a firm can use financial markets to debt finance the 
acquisition of fixed capital assets.  The investing business is aware of the inherent costs 
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of issuing more debt to finance investment given the uncertainty of fully capitalizing its 
prospective yields.  This is not really an objective cost, however it is more of a subjective 
cost based on the current sentiment to risk that pervades a certain point in time.  It is 
reasonable to say that borrower’s risk will rise sharply beyond a certain amount of 
investment spending.  This is because the rise in externally financed investment-spending 
increases the amount of debt-to-equity of the firm on top of a greater productive capacity.  
Firms will look to maintain a certain desired level of utilization of capacity so any 
additions to the capital stock beyond this will raise the risk of unplanned excess capacity.  
Underutilization of capacity will make covering the existing liability structure of the firm 
more cumbersome.   
In addition to the borrower’s risk, lenders require a margin of safety that arises 
out of the possibility a borrower will be unable to fulfill contract arrangements.   This can 
occur when borrowers overestimate their prospective yields or in the event of voluntary 
default.  The lender’s risk is reflected in the terms of the loan agreement and interest rate.   
In a world where finance is relevant the pace of investment will reflect the 
intersection of the supply price of investment adjusted for lenders risk and the demand 
price for capital assets adjusted for borrowers risk.  The margins of safety underscore the 
current sentiment of both borrowers and lenders and the point where investment will take 
place.  Given that the margins of safety are the subjective valuation regarding the 
appropriate levels of borrowing and lending in an economy, the level of investment is 
largely dependent on the state of confidence at any given time in a business cycle.   
Minsky argues that business cycles occur endogenously because of the 
relationship between higher levels of investment during an economic recovery and higher 
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rates of profit in subsequent periods.  The following period will show levels of actual 
retained earnings in excess of anticipated earnings.  The unexpected rise in retained 
earnings will raise the demand for investment effectively increasing the demand price for 
capital assets at each output; thus, reinforcing the firms sentiment toward additional 
external finance.  The capacity to issue more external finance will rise as the equity of the 
firm rises relative to its level of debt.  In other words, the unexpected increase in profits 
improves the balance sheet of the firm as its debt to equity ratio falls.  Flush with 
unanticipated unused borrowing power the firm’s subjective view of borrower’s risk will 
drop.  The firm’s sentiment to additional investment will be more favorable than in the 
previous period.   
Lenders will see the capitalization of prospective yields by businesses as a signal 
to increase lending as the firms ability to service its debt improves.  In effect, the prior 
margins of safety might be thought of as excessive.  The subjective way in which 
businesses and lenders evaluate risk is changing as overall sentiment changes from 
pessimistic to optimistic. 
A greater pace of investment, however, creates more productive capacity and 
increases the overall level of debt in the economy.  This subjects the economy to the 
increasing risks of unanticipated excess capacity and exposure to debt.  Over the course 
of an economic boom the higher than expected retained earnings early on induces 
additional investment raising the productive capacity in subsequent periods.  The rise in 
productive capacity will force the price of capital assets down as their abundance ceases 
to make them scarce.  Investment will drop as undesirable levels of excess capacity begin 
to surface.  A fall in the level of investment demand will lower retained earnings in the 
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later stages of the economic boom.  If the actual level of retained earnings falls below 
expectations, then investment will fall along with the rate of profit.   The economy is on 
precarious grounds as the proportion of debt begins to rise relative to equity.   
In short, unexpectedly high profits today raises the desirability of investment in 
subsequent periods, but this also creates more capacity and more debt that puts the 
economy into a state where risk has risen sufficient enough to threaten further expansion 
leading to a period of stagnation or contraction.  This is the general premise behind 
Minsky’s endogenous business cycle theory.   
The pace of investment in a society is so important because it is what drives the 
level of profits.  However in a world with highly developed financial markets the level of 
investment is not only influenced by internal accumulation of capital, but the overall 
sentiment both borrowers and lenders place on their perceptions about the future.  Minsky 
formulates an endogenous business cycle theory from the evolution of various financing 
units during the course of the trade cycle.  His ideas originate from a ‘Wall Street’ 
perspective as he unearths the endogenous movement of a firm from financial robustness 
to fragility.  Financial stability is threatened as debt finance transforms the financing units 
from a hedged financial position to an ever-more speculative reliance on the normal 
functioning of the financial market.  As Keynes famously said,  
[T]he position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of 
speculation.  When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of 
the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done (Keynes, 1936, p. 159).  
  
Minsky builds on this notion of speculative capitalist development in his Financial 
Instability Hypothesis.  The following section will examine in depth how the financial 
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structure of the firm undergoes a fundamental change throughout the course of the 
business cycle.   
 
Section 1.02 Cash-flow-to-payment of various financing units 
As we have said, Minsky approaches the Financial Instability Hypothesis by 
looking at the financial unit from a Wall Street perspective.  Thomas Murphy, long time 
CEO of General Motors, best describes this point of view when he was quoted as saying 
“General Motors is not in the business of making cars.  It is in the business of making 
money.”  Wall Street is not concerned with the physical productivity of capital assets nor 
the tangible asset being produced, but their concern lies only in the profitability of capital 
assets.  As previously discussed, the expected profitability of the stock of capital assets 
determines their value and the greater the price of capital assets the greater the pace of 
investment that can be financed.  Thus, in a society where external financing determines 
the pace of investment there must be an examination into the implications of servicing a 
growing debt burden.   
Different financing units can be broken down into individual entities that generate 
cash flows.  Minsky breaks down the different types of cash flows in to three distinct 
groups:  income cash flow, balance-sheet cash flows and portfolio cash flow.   
Income cash flows are determined by the every day operations of a firm.  This 
includes the labor costs such as wages and salaries, accounts payable and receivable, 
payments for final and intermediate products, and total profits after tax.  As we will see, 
income cash flows play a crucial role in the financial integrity of a financing unit.  They 
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are what Minsky describes as “the foundation upon which the balance-sheet and portfolio 
cash flows rest” (Minsky, 2008, p. 226).       
Balance-sheet cash flows1 are generated from servicing a legacy of existing or 
acquired liabilities.  Past decisions to expand the stock of existing capital assets using 
some sort of external financing require the payment of interest and principle based on the 
terms and conditions per some agreed upon contract.   
Portfolio cash flows are the product of exchanging the capital or financial assets 
either by acquiring or selling assets or putting new liabilities into circulation.  The sale of 
an investment good generates income cash flow to the producer of the good, but the 
purchaser of the investment good is generating a portfolio transaction with the acquisition 
of a capital asset just like when an investing entity acquires a financial asset to diversify 
their portfolio.  Portfolio transactions can be used to raise money via the liquidation of 
the current stock of assets.  
Everyday financial units ranging from firms and households to financial 
institution generate a combination of income, balance sheet and portfolio cash flows to 
conduct business.  Under the modern capitalist mode of production financial instability 
rests on the role all three cash flows play during any given economic epic.  The 
movement from relative economic tranquility to speculation-led capital development that 
engenders financial instability is largely based on the financing of positions in assets and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Different types of balance-sheet cash flows can be described as demand, dated and contingent.  Demand 
deposits are the characteristic balance-sheet cash flows associated with banking.  They are the short-term 
financial instruments such as checking and savings deposits that underscore the traditional functions of the 
banking sector.  Dated cash flows are no more than our traditional home or car loans that divide a certain 
monthly contract into partly principle and interest payments.  Another typical type of dated contract is the 
bond.  Finally, contingent cash flows are claims due to the endorsement by a third party of a note, insurance 
policies and the common stock of a corporation.	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associated cash flows that support these positions.  Minsky (2008, p. 230) categorizes 
these different financing units identified in the financial structure of modern capitalism as 
hedge, speculative and Ponzi finaning units.  The movement from financial robustness to 
instability can be described by the evolution of financing units through each of these 
financial structures. 
When an economy emerges from economic crisis there are periods of tranquility 2 
where an economy is growing more smoothly.  This period can be defined by a 
temporary economic state that lies in between the periods of crisis -- such as financial and 
monetary crises or debt-deflations -- and euphoric booms periods where irrational 
psychology drives speculation-led capital development.  According to Minsky, this 
purely transitory state in capitalist development is dominated by hedge financing units.   
Hedge financing units are characterized by their ability to meet present and future 
contractual payments on liabilities (interest and principle) from the income cash flows 
they generate from operations.  Internal and long-term financing as well as minimal 
amounts of demand debt are attributes of a firm that hedges its finance of capital assets.  
During periods of economic tranquility, margins of safety of both lenders and borrowers 
reflect the risk-averse state of confidence that underscores this class of financing units.  
Often times, emerging from an economic crisis carries the memory of the not-so-distant 
hardships of the recent past.  Households, firms and financial institutions having been 
burned by the shortfalls of the previous period of financial instability proceed with 
contractual agreements that reflect their sentiment toward uncertainty.  Hedge financing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This term is borrowed by Hyman Minsky from Joan Robinson in an effort to avoid using the misleading 
idea of a general equilibrium in economics. 
	  
19	  
units are only vulnerable to unfavorable changes in their expected income cash flows or 
real sector developments whereas speculative and Ponzi financing units also display 
vulnerability to unfavorable changes in financial sector developments.   
Speculative financing units relay on income cash flows and the performance of 
their portfolio cash flows to pay the interest on cash payment commitments, but shortfalls 
arise on payments to the principal of maturing debts.  This situation requires the rolling 
over of maturing debt in order to meet financial obligations.  Essentially, speculative 
financing units rely on the normal functioning of the financial system to sustain current 
operations with the expectation that future cash receipts will be sufficient to meet the 
cash payments on debts being refinanced today.  Commercial banks, for example, are a 
good example of speculative financing units in that demand debt is a key attribute of their 
day-to-day operations.  Traditional operations of a bank involve the short financing of 
long positions a defining characteristic speculative finance.  It is important to note that 
when short-term debt is used to finance positions in long-term assets a window of 
vulnerability is opened to increases in the short-term interest rates.  A large increase in 
the short-term rates can move speculative financing units to Ponzi financing units, the 
third and most unstable class of financing units.  
Ponzi financing units differ from speculative units in that they must increase debt 
in order to make cash payments on outstanding liabilities.  The cash flows from income 
are not only insufficient to make payments on the principal, but the cost of financing 
existing liabilities is greater than the cash receipts from operations.  Ponzi financing units 
not only have to roll over existing debt, but they also have to borrow additional funds or 
liquidate financial assets to make cash payments on interest.    
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 The evolution of the financial system from robust -- where hedge finance 
predominates -- to instable -- where speculative and Ponzi finance becomes increasingly 
abundant -- is associated with the capitalist drive for profit opportunities.  During periods 
of tranquility, the economy is dominated by hedge finance.  This period is characteristic 
of low debt to equity ratios as high margins of safety drive investing units to fund the 
purchase of additional capital assets predominately with retained earnings.  Large interest 
rate spreads between short-term and long-term rates feed speculative arrangement as 
financing units look to profit on financing position in capital assets. 
Minsky develops his Financial Instability Hypothesis from this profit seeking 
behavior of the different financing units that arise out of an economy that is financially 
robust.  This period is characterized by short-term interest rates that are much lower than 
the yield from owning capital.  The conditions are primed for hedge financing units to 
exploit interest rate differentials in order to ‘make on the carry.’3   
The movement toward financial instability rises as the margins of safety wane 
with the memory of past financial crises.  An environment is forming where the state of 
confidence and credit is growing as debt leveraged speculative development ensues.   The 
profits that are expected by firms drive up the price of capital assets further increasing in 
the pace of investment.  National income increases as an investment boom ensues driving 
up profits on the existing stock of capital assets.  As expected profits are capitalized, 
firms find that their existing liability structure is compatible with a previous stage of 
confidence.  Minsky writes,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Minsky often used this term to describe the speculative arrangement of issuing short-term liabilities to 
finance positions in long-term assets.   
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[Firms] find themselves with an unused margin of ‘borrowing power.’  This 
margin is as good as retained earnings in providing a basis for expansion of 
ownership of capital assets.  Thus an increase in confidence and in the state of 
credit is equivalent in its effect upon the potential for debt-financing of 
investment to an improvement in current yield (Minsky, 1975, p. 120). 
   
If the banks are willing to meet the demand for finance with an ample supply of credit 
(that is, if the state of credit increases with the state of confidence), then the level of 
external financing of investment is likely to increase as well. 
The period of expansion where profits increase with debt paves the way for 
financial instability where balance sheet cash flows become increasingly burdensome.  
The necessity to refinance or roll over existing liabilities becomes dependent on the 
normal functioning of the financial sector.  Firms that participate in speculative financing 
are especially vulnerable to an increase in short-term interest rates.  A large enough 
increase in the interest rate without the corresponding increase in the income cash flows 
can move hedged firms to speculative financing and speculative firms to Ponzi financing.  
The financial stability of the system erodes as more and more firms succumb to 
speculative and Ponzi arrangements.  Financial instability is characterized by a period of 
increased indebtedness with a corresponding drop in profits.   
 A rise in interest rates increases the carrying cost of capital assets that were 
financed using short-term liabilities.  When it comes time to refinance or roll over those 
debts the higher interest rate decreases the present value of the future profits the capital 
asset is estimated to earn.  In addition, the total cost of the investment project will 
increase with a rise in interest rates.  Essentially, when speculative finance is involved, 
the rise in short-term interest rates decreases the price of capital assets both by raising 
discount rates as well as lowering expected profits which raises the price of investment 
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output as total cost of production increases.  Investment will be perceived as misplaced or 
excessive leading to an overabundance of capital.  If capital ceases to be scarce, then the 
marginal profitability of capital can fall considerably.  As firms fail to capitalize expected 
profits the state of confidence can collapse.  As firms look to position themselves into 
more liquid assets to insure against contingencies, liquidity preferences are likely to rise.  
This can only exacerbate financial instability as firms’ propensity to hoard puts additional 
upward pressure on interest rates.   
Minsky purports that the events that trigger a crisis are not unusual; however, they 
are a “normal result of the financing relations that lead into and take place during an 
investment boom” (Minsky, 2008, p. 242).  Moreover, he explains that there are common 
features of a speculative led investment boom that add to its inherent instability: 
[d]uring investment booms material and labor costs also rise.  Furthermore, 
shortages -- or bottlenecks -- develop, delaying the completion of projects.  As 
interest rates, costs of inputs, and delays increase the costs of the investment, the 
ratio of available internal funds to the cost of the project will decrease, even if the 
flow of internal funds remains constant (ibid.).   
 
Thus, the endemic nature of the modern economy is its endogenous movement to 
financial instability that leaves it vulnerable to economic shocks that lead to a collapse in 
confidence and the state of credit.  If the price of capital assets falls below that of the 
supply price for investment, then a situation arises where both debt and profits fall 
leading to a possible debt-deflation characteristic of the one famously theorized by Irving 
Fisher.   
Minsky’s theory does not, however, predict a specified amount of time in which 
hedged finance transitions into more speculative financing arrangements.  There are a 
number of barriers that initially stand in the way of exploiting large interest rate 
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differentials.  Minsky describes five ways how profit opportunities might not bring about 
the immediate movement to financial fragility4; however, it is the fifth barrier that I 
would like to point attention to: 
endogenous increases in money and liquid assets raise the price of capital assets 
relative to money and current output prices…so that investment will rise, 
increasing the yield of the existing stock of capital assets.  This means that the 
internal financing through retained earnings is greater than anticipated, and the 
push toward a greater use of short-term debt in liability structures is frustrated 
(Minsky, 2008, p. 237). 
 
This particular barrier is interesting because it describes a scenario where internal finance 
of investment is preferred to the external financing due to the perceived increase of risk 
associated with issuing additional liabilities.  This reflects Minsky’s understanding of 
Michal Kalecki’s Principle of Increasing Risk (1937), however he downplays the 
significance of Kalecki’s theory in his Financial Instability Hypothesis.  Minsky believes 
that as time passes and the previous period of economic woes fade from recent memory, 
sentiments change. 
Success, Minsky explains, breeds a disregard of the possibility of failure; the 
absence of serious financial difficulties over a substantial period leads to the 
development of a euphoric economy in which increasing short-term financing of 
long positions becomes a normal way of life (ibid.).   
 
Success breeds the expectation of future success amid an environment conducive to risk-
taking motivated by capitalists’ drive for profits. 
 The failure to unify Kalecki’s Principle of Increasing Risk with Minsky’s 
Financial Instability Hypothesis has not gone unnoticed and some economists have made 
this a cornerstone of their critiques of Minsky.  Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1990) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For a complete list of the barriers to exploiting interest rate differentials see Minsky, H. 2008.  Stabilizing 
an Unstable Economy, New York, McGraw Hill, pp. 235 - 237. 
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Lavoie (1986, 1995, 1996) question whether or not higher growth rates necessarily 
translate into higher ratio of debt to equity.  By and large their conclusions point to the 
possibility of something quite different than the Minsky process thus stated.  When 
effective demand is taken into account a Minsky boom need not to lead inevitably to 
higher levels of debt to equity.   
Lavoie and Seccareccia (2001) argue that Minsky’s microeconomic model of 
endogenous financial fragility has a missing link at the macroeconomic level.  When 
applying the Minsky process to the macroeconomic level, they believe Minsky has 
subjected himself to a “fallacy of composition” that undermines the integrity of his 
theory: 
 …it is controversial because it was initially derived from a macroeconomic 
model that was built on the loanable funds approach and which ignored the 
principle of effective demand, and because it was later heuristically justified on 
the basis of a microeconomic construction (Lavoie and Seccareccia, 2001, p. 85).  
 
 Minsky’s model is incompatible with Kalecki because ultimately it fails to explain why 
greater debt ratios are an inescapable consequence of economic expansion.   
  The following chapter will delve a bit deeper into this controversy by   examining 
the Minsky process through a Kaleckian lens.  Approaching Minsky from the alternative 
perspective of savings and debt in an open economy might reveal some insight into the 







Chapter II. Savings and Debt, Firm Size, and Financialization  
In the aggregate, Minsky suggests that profit opportunities entice firms to ‘gear’ 
their productive capacity in such a way that the proportion of business capital to equity  -- 
that is, their gearing ratio -- is essentially increasing over time.   Formulating this model 
is unequivocally dependent on the euphoric sentiment permeating the financial markets 
during a period of unbridled success.  Increasing the gearing ratio is in effect leveraging 
the fixed capital assets against internal liquidity or equity of a business.  
 In a positive economic climate where the capitalization of expected profits 
prevail, a higher gearing ratio translates to an exceptionally high rate of profit on equity; 
however, the opposite is also true when investment falls short of expectations.  When the 
prospective yield on these capital assets fall short of the rate of interest, then losses of 
profits on equity is also amplified and particularly severe.  This presents Minsky with the 
problem of ‘increasing risk’ associated with greater investment in relation to equity.  
When outside savings is relatively elastic in the upward direction -- the proportion of 
entrepreneurial capital falls in relation to outside savings -- the increase in the net gearing 
ratio increases the overall risk of the firm.  The decision to invest is strained by declining 
levels of internal accumulation relative to its degree of indebtedness.   
 For Minsky, the increasing risk associated with a higher gearing ratio must pale in 
comparison to the euphoric sentiment that success is all but certain.  A higher rate of 
profit from being leveraged in such a way as to exploit the opportunity to make on the 
carry is the driving force behind Minsky’s theory.  However the increasing risk 
associated with augmenting one’s exposure to debt suggests that given the opportunity to 
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do so, firms would pay particular attention to their gearing ratio for fear of failure in the 
event of unsuccessful business ventures.   
A rising gearing ratio is pivotal to Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis and I 
would like to proceed with a discussion of what this might mean with regard to savings 
and debt.  Here I want to begin with the fundamental economic identity that equates 
investment and savings.  In addition, I am going to use Josef Steindl’s (1982) definition 
of savings by distinguishing between household savings and business savings.  Now a 
simple investment-savings identity can be established and verified from the national 
accounts:  Gross business real investment plus exports plus government spending plus 
household real investment equals gross business savings (entrepreneurial capital) plus 
household savings (outside savings) plus imports plus government tax revenue.  That is, I 
+ X + G + H = Sb + Sh + M + T, where the left hand side of the identity are defined as 
active ones -- they are predetermined by past decision based on past expectations of the 
current economic reality -- and the right hand side of the identity defined as passive ones 
-- they adjust themselves passively to the active ones.  In other words, the sum of the 
former is financed by the sum of the latter.  This is merely Steindl’s more specific 
definition to the Keynesian problem of adjustment of savings to investment.   
I would like to begin with a hypothetical case of a closed economy with no 
government (or it can be assumed that the government maintains a balanced budget).  
This conceptually simple case aligns with Minsky’s original framework and it will 
provide the foundations that will remain when we move to a more complicated open 
economy.  In this simpler case I assume that household real investment is zero, i.e. there 
is no investment in housing purchases assuming all dwelling units are built by businesses 
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and leased to households.  Furthermore, we are examining the impact of a rising net 
gearing ratio on economic development so we can ignore all inter-indebtedness between 
businesses.  We can now assume that all savings outside of those internally accumulated 
by the firm are claims of households against businesses. 
Now our new simplified investment - savings identity can be written in stock 
terms as follows.  The stock of real capital assets (K) is equal to the sum of the wealth 
claims against it, which are Wb and Wh, that is, business wealth and household wealth 
respectively.  Wb is equal to equity (E), and all outside savings is assumed to take the 
form of debt and are accumulated by firms as claims of household wealth, Wh = D.   So 
the ratio of debt to equity for the economy is equal to the ratio of household wealth to 
business wealth, D / E = Wh / Wb.  Similarly, the gearing ratio (g) is the proportion of 
the total stock of real capital assets to that of it owned by businesses.  Therefore we have 
g = K/Wb = [(D + E)/E] = [(Wb+Wh)/Wb], or g = 1 + (Wh/Wb).   
Let’s move on to the impact of a rising gearing ratio on savings and debt as 
implied in Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis.   In this simplified economy, Y = C 
+ I = wL + Πh + Πb, where wL is wage income, and Πh and Πb are profits going to 
household and business respectively.  The decision to invest by business is (dK/dt)/K = 
I/K = (Sh + Sb)/(Wh + Wb) = [(dD/dt) + (dE/dt)]/(D + E), where S is the flow of each 
type of savings.  Household savings (Sh) is equal to the household propensity to save (sh) 
out of household wages or profits times the level of wages plus profits.  Business savings 
(Sb) is equal to business profits since all retained earnings are saved by definition.  Thus 
we have Sh/Sb = (shwL+shΠh)/Πb.  The Sh/Sb ratio is determined by the mark-up, 
which determines the distribution of income between wages and profits; the dividend 
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payout rate, which determines the distribution of profits between businesses and 
households; and the household propensity to save.  Since all of these tend to be relatively 
stable in the short-run, the debt to equity ratio of an economy is likely to be determined 
by the current sentiment toward investment.  If I/K > Πb/K, then the ratio of debt to 
equity will rise in an economy.   
 For Minsky, at the beginning of a boom period when the state of confidence 
among households raises consumer demand and the current sentiment among 
entrepreneurs towards the capitalization of expected earnings is positive, firms will want 
to respond to an increase in the rate of growth of output by expanding the existing stock 
of fixed capital assets.  That is, in the middle of an economic upswing the desire for real 
fixed investment will rise in response to a rate of growth of output that is greater than the 
rate of growth of capacity.  Actual investment spending will raise profit inflow, but 
before this occurs external finance will have to increase to order to finance the rise in 
desired investment, and the net gearing ratio for the economy will have to rise (See Mott 
2010, pp. 129-1312). 
If the contributed proportions of the business and household wealth are adjusted 
to the desired levels of internal and external finance in accordance to a rising net gearing 
ratio, then Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis implies that the proportion of 
outside savings is accumulating more quickly relative to entrepreneurs’ capital.  This 
statement suggests that the proportion of outside savings to internal business savings is 
relatively elastic; its accumulation adjusts itself more readily than internal accumulation 
to a change in real fixed investment.  Under this circumstance, the net gearing ratio for 
the economy as a whole must have a tendency to rise with any increase in the rate of 
	  
29	  
growth of real capital assets.  External finance takes precedent over internal finance and 
financial market conditions lay the groundwork for speculative financial arrangements to 
become the norm.  
If the proportion of household wealth accumulates more readily than 
entrepreneurial capital, then any initial rise in real capital accumulation that raises the net 
gearing ratio of the economy would be met with increasing risk.  When the rise in debt to 
equity seems too risky to a firm, real fixed investment will fall and household savings 
will fall as income falls.  Faced with falling consumer demand, businesses will scale back 
additional investment projects as actual earnings fall below expected earnings precisely 
when firms will desire to lower their ratio of debt to liquid assets even further; a fall in 
the rate of profit will prompt entrepreneurs to reduce their net gearing ratios.  This would 
lead to an additional fall in the rate of investment.   
In order to avoid an economic downturn from spiraling out of control, the 
proportion of outside savings must accumulate less readily than entrepreneurial capital 
with a fall in investment.  An argument might be made that owing to a large fall in the 
effective demand, falling prices and interest rates would discourage households from 
saving.  The level of consumption would actually increase thus creating the necessary 
amount of household dissavings necessary to prevent the disequilibrium from spiraling 
out of control.   
A relatively elastic outside savings seems to create a situation in which the 
economy is inherently stable!  Any disequilibrium brought forth by the animal spirits of 
men sets in motion a self-correcting mechanism that returns the economy back toward its 
original equilibrium level of production and consumption.  In this case the proportionate 
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rise in outside savings to internal accumulation puts a halt to any upward disequilibrium.  
Conversely, when the economy begins to slump the subsequent fall in accumulation of 
outside savings to internal accumulation provides the spark in consumer demand to 
reignite investment.   
Of course reality suggests something quite different.  The economy appears to 
transit from this self-corrective state to something more tumultuous.  As before, let us 
imagine that a falling rate of profit provides the impetus for firms to lower their net 
gearing ratio.  In their attempt to lower the proportion of outside savings to 
entrepreneurial capital, firms will be inclined to reduce the rate of investment.  It stands 
to reason that at this point the firm has no control over its degree of indebtedness.  When 
the accumulation of real capital declines (i.e. real GDP decreases), if the proportion of 
household savings doesn’t fall more readily than business savings, then firms will be 
forced into a greater degree of indebtedness.  The dissavings required by households to 
accommodate the desire of firms to lower their net gearings ratio comes face to face with 
a rising tide of unemployment.  As Steindl writes in Maturity and Stagnation in American 
Capitalism, 
Whatever elasticity of outside savings there might be…is dependent on 
unemployment.  If therefore the real capital accumulation decreases, and it 
becomes necessary to reduce the rate at which outside savings accumulate in 
order to prevent a growing disequilibrium, then a considerable increase in the 
degree of secular unemployment is practically the only means to this end (Steindl, 
1976, p. 118).   
 
The illiquidity of specific fixed capital assets such as factories or specialized equipment 
compels firms to dispose of variable capital such as labor.   
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However, as the level of unemployment raises the uncertainty of a steady income 
flow to households in future periods, spending is likely to collapse with consumer 
confidence.  This compels the entrepreneur to address the concerns regarding the 
solvency of his or her enterprise as the proportion of outside savings is being reduced less 
readily than internal accumulation.  Firms are being forced to borrow more in order to 
make payments on the principle of maturing debt, or worse, to make cash payment on 
existing liabilities.  This is analogous to Keynes’ paradox of thrift.  In this scenario 
outside savings appears to be relatively inelastic! 
Kalecki offers two ideas that seem to verify the prospects of an inelastic outside 
savings.  The first resides in his idea that the existence of monopoly capital allows firms a 
certain degree of price fixing that is determined by a mark-up on prime cost.  It is 
unlikely businesses will be able to lower their net gearing ratio without falling prices 
relative to money wages that bring about the required level of household dissavings to 
offset lackluster investment demand.   
The second is found in Kalecki’s “The Principle of Increasing Risk” (1937).  
There are two reasons why marginal risk rises with an increase in investment.  First, the 
greater the investment the more wealth is tied up in the firm increasing the risk of 
substantial losses to the entrepreneur in the event of unsuccessful business.  The degree 
of losses incurred by the entrepreneur is magnified by external finance.  The greater the 
proportion of business capital to equity, the greater the risk and more severe the penalty 
in the event of failure.  In the event that an entrepreneur fails to make a return on 
business, the level of debt will determine his or her net loss on income.  Moreover, a 
greater proportion of borrowed capital to equity will require a higher risk premium for 
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credit.  The higher risk premium increases the magnitude of the net losses in the event of 
unsuccessful business ventures.  Eventually, access to the credit market will be 
eliminated when a firm’s ability to make payments on its liabilities come into question.   
It seems reasonable to believe that firms will wish to use entrepreneurial capital 
rather than outside savings to fund investment due to the increasing risk associated with a 
rising net gearing ratio.   Investment from entrepreneurial capital circumvents the hurdles 
associated with a limited capital market while simultaneously expanding the firm’s 
capital making it possible to acquire new loans at a lower risk premium if need be.   
Second, there are dangers associated with the illiquidity of fixed capital assets.  
Kalecki points out that the sale of specific capital assets such as a factory or specialized 
equipment are almost always connected with a loss:  
…the amount invested k [capital] must be considered as a fully illiquid asset in 
the case of sudden need for ‘capital.’  In that situation the entrepreneur who has 
invested in equipment his reserves and taken ‘too much credit’ is obliged to 
borrow at a rate of interest which is higher than the market one (Kalecki, 1937, p. 
442).   
 
The inability to liquidate the amount-invested capital without incurring a substantial loss 
underscores the dangers associated with over capacity.    
Steindl (1976) points out that the increasing risk associated with over-capacity 
dampens the influence a higher degree of utilization has on real fixed investment.  He 
notes that the more monopolistic industries not only have the power to influence prices, 
but the dangers associated with excess capacity are likely to diminish their inducement to 
invest associated with higher rates of profit. Increasing the stock of capital too much will 
lower the degree of utilization of capacity.  In essence the capital stock of an industry 
becomes relatively abundant leading to a decrease in its marginal profitability -- it ceases 
	  
33	  
to be scarce.  By weakening the influence on their decision to increase the level of real 
fixed investment at higher rates of capital utilization, the largest firms that make up the 
local economy will be discouraged from expanding too fast.  This will detract from their 
demand on capital markets to provide external finance5.   
Moreover, Steindl (1990) argues that during times of success it seems all the more 
likely for firms to take the higher yields they receive from their existing stock of capital 
assets and invest a portion of the additional income and save the rest.  The level of 
investment out of a change in income is based the firms’ marginal propensity to save and 
this is likely to differ with the size of the firm.  For example, we may presume that the 
capitalization of expected profits by larger more monopolistic industries would result in a 
greater proportion of income going to replenish their equity; hence, the monopolistic 
industries can be said to have a higher marginal propensity to save than the more 
competitive industries.  Thus, for certain industries a rise in real capital accumulation has 
the effect of increasing internal accumulation providing additional finance for investment 
without increasing the firm’s relative indebtedness.  In this case, the accumulation of 
outside savings is proportionately smaller than internal accumulation effectively reducing 
the net gearing ratio.  As before, this implies the use of outside savings by firms is 
relatively inelastic.  
In our simplified case of a closed economy with no government, Kalecki’s 
Principle of Increasing Risk appears to be in conflict with Minsky’s Financial Instability 
Hypothesis by its implicit determination of the relative elasticity of outside savings.  This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Steindl, Joseph (1976).  Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism, New York: Monthly 
Review Press, Ch. 10 for a detailed analysis on the ‘The Consequences of Undesired Excess Capacity’ in 
monopolistic and oligopolistic industries. 
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doesn’t dismiss Minsky’s theory as irrelevant; however, if the capital market can absorb a 
large portion of outside savings without necessitating an increase in the net gearing ratio 
for the entire economy, then the Principle of Increasing Risk could be unified with the 
Financial Instability Hypothesis.  In fact, as soon as we open up the economy to include 
both domestic savings and foreign savings the situation becomes much more interesting.  
Therefore, the apparent contradiction begs the following questions in our analysis of 
endogenous financial instability: (1) what constitutes the different types of savings and 
their respective elasticities in an open economy, (2) how are the outside savings 
distributed among firms of differing size i.e. how do financing constraints influence the 
position of the various firms and (3) how does the level of outside saving affect the 
stability of financial markets. 
 
Section 2.01 Outside Savings 
Firms’ savings are the profits generated by operations less payment on existing 
liabilities, dividends, taxes and methods of doing business.  They are the portions of 
profits that are retained by the business as reserves.  For a private business, this is merely 
the retained earnings from operations also know as the entrepreneurs’ private capital.  For 
corporations or joint-stock companies, they are a combination of retained earnings plus 
share capital more generally known as entrepreneurial capital.  Some economists simply 
refer to this process as internal accumulation.    
 Internal accumulation of a firm, to some degree, will induce investment.  As 
expected earnings are capitalized and the expansion of a firm generates some savings out 
of profits, then the additional investment can be finance from retained earnings to the 
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advantage of avoiding additional balance sheet cash-flows and a limited capital market.  
A firms’ savings will be held as our point of reference when comparing the relative 
elasticities of outside savings.  As discussed earlier, we are concerned with how the 
accumulation of outside savings adjusts itself with respect to internal accumulation with a 
change in investment.   
 In an open economy total outside savings consist of domestic outside savings and 
foreign savings.  First, let us examine the various components of the former.  Domestic 
outside savings can be divided into three categories: (1) savings of wage earners, (2) 
savings of professional and high salary earners and (3) rentiers’ saving. 
  
Saving of Wage and Low Salary Earners 
Of household savings the savings of wage and low salary earners is negligible.  
Most wage earners spend most or all of their income on wage goods.  In addition, the 
level of exploitation is generally more pronounced in developing and emerging market 
economies.  Therefore, I assume the savings from this demographic to be zero.   
  
Saving of Profession and High Salary Earners 
Savings of professional and high salary earners will make up a significant portion 
of household savings.  At a glance, it seems plausible to believe that this portion of 
household savings would be relatively elastic.  During a boom, when unemployment falls 
to levels nearer to full employment, the level of savings is likely to rise to an extent.  
Rising share prices might influence more participation from households in the equity 
market. Furthermore, during a downturn when unemployment is rising, an increase in 
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competition among job seekers within this demographic might force some recently 
unemployed professionals into a period of dissavings.   
On the other hand, penalties associated with private pension and retirement 
accounts lead to a disincentive to tap into private pension funds and retirement accounts.  
This will dampen the effect of unemployment on savings.  Plus, an economic downturn 
can actually cause a rise in savings as a safety net for increased uncertainty.  Households 
that have not been laid off might increase their savings today for fear of being 
unemployed tomorrow.  It seems to me that this would make household savings 
somewhat inelastic with respect to income.   
   
Rentiers’ Savings 
Rentiers’ saving is the least elastic form of savings.  The inelasticity of rentiers’ 
saving is not to be underestimated since -- like the savings of professional and high salary 
earners -- it makes up a significant portion of outside savings.  Kalecki (1943) and later 
Steindl (1976) point to the inelasticity of rentiers’ saving as having a pernicious effect on 
the accumulation of capital during periods of economic stagnation.  As Steindl points out, 
 …the long-term rate of interest can hardly be reduced below a certain level; the 
interest paid…on corporate bonds…includes a risk premiums which are 
themselves not very elastic…[t]hus rentiers’ saving will change only very 
sluggishly, and will prove completely inelastic below a certain minimum (Steindl, 
1976, p. 115).   
 
Therefore, during periods of economic stagnation rentiers’ income is not likely to be 
effected very much and a persistently high propensity to save will weigh heavily on the 
price of capital assets i.e. the necessary dissavings required to meet the firms desire to 
eliminate debt is inadequate or nonexistent.   
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The accumulation of outside savings in excess of the demand for investment leads 
to a fall in retained earnings relative to the existing stock of capital assets thus depressing 
investment further as debts continue to rise.  Essentially what we have is Irving Fisher’s 
debt-deflation theory of great depressions.     
 So just as before we arrive at the same conclusion that domestic outside savings 
appears to be relatively inelastic.  Kalecki and Steindl both observe that in a closed 
economy this aligns with the principle of increasing risk; however, with financial 
liberalization there is a massive injection of foreign savings that inundates the domestic 
economies in additional savings that must be borrowed by businesses or households.  
How does foreign savings come to influence total outside savings? 
 
Foreign Savings  
For most countries foreign savings is the most significant source of total outside 
savings.  Market friendly economic policies that integrate and deregulate their domestic 
financial sectors open the floodgates for substantial external capital inflows originating 
from the large financial hubs in the developed world.  The sheer size of these external 
capital flows relative to the size of the domestic financial sector is of considerable 
importance when we consider the elasticity of total outside savings.  Countries that rely 
heavily on imports and/or those countries with relatively weak capital markets will face a 
large deficit in foreign balances with a rise in national income.  Often times these 
countries are vulnerable to large inflows of external capital because of the size and 
volatility of the foreign capital flows relative to their respective financial sectors.   
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 For the countries that rely heavily on imports, the flow of foreign savings is likely 
to move with great flexibility to a change in national income.  When GDP increases, 
higher demand for imports -- either as intermediate goods in production or luxury goods 
or for whatever reason -- increases the domestic economy’s deficit in foreign balances 
(Steindl, 1988 [1990]).  The increase in lending from the outside world will continue to 
rise as the inflow of external capital acts to appreciate the domestic currency driving a 
surge in domestic demand for imported goods.   This inflow of foreign savings must be 
absorbed by local businesses or households as a form of debt financed production or 
consumption.  The internal accumulation of the firm is likely to increase proportionately 
less than total outside savings; thus, foreign savings would push the elasticity of outside 
savings to a point that is greater than firm’s savings.   
 Those countries that rely on the foreign capital markets due to the ‘backwardness’ 
of their own weaker capital markets can benefit from financial liberalization in order to 
relieve financing constraints for investment.  In orthodox economic theory, liberalized 
capital markets ameliorate ‘savings constrained’ underdeveloped economies with access 
to the world financial markets in order to finance investment; these economies suffer 
from the ‘backwardness’ of their own underdeveloped domestic financial sectors.  The 
premise of this economic doctrine is based on the idea that the imperfections that 
permeate the domestic capital markets create financing constraints that block real fixed 
investment and -- when the appropriate policies and reforms are implemented with care -- 
capital market liberalization is the key economic fix to low savings and financially 
constrained economies.  In orthodox economic theory domestic outside savings is 
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inadequate to finance the desired level of investment so access to foreign savings can 
make up the difference becoming a significant portion of total outside savings. 
So long as the domestic economy is savings constrained, then the majority of 
foreign savings would be directed at real fixed investment.  Domestic borrowers would 
be looking to foreign capital markets to finance their domestic investment at lower 
interest rates.  Domestic banks would lower their lending standards in order to lend 
money to the domestic economy at rates that exceed their borrowing costs abroad.  The 
net gearing ratio for the domestic economy would increase as the initial injection of 
foreign savings is used to externally finance the initial demand for real capital assets.  
The higher levels of investment domestically will increase the rate of profit in the 
economy and retained earnings will begin to rise.  Although domestic outside savings 
might not change vary much during the expansion in real capital assets, foreign savings 
will move enthusiastically to the higher returns.  The positive returns on the savings of 
foreign investors will embolden their remise as they seek to thrust additional savings into 
the developing markets in search for additional (speculative?) investment opportunities in 
various assets.  Foreign savings would be relatively elastic in this regard; hence, financial 
instability would progress in accordance to Minsky’s theory.   
Alternative ideas suggest that the lack of investment in underdeveloped 
economies is not merely an issue of financing or savings constraints, but a wide variety of 
economic issues that affect the expected returns on investment.  Rodrik (2009) suggests 
that such an economy is not necessarily savings constrained as orthodox theory purports, 
but rather investment constrained.  The culprit is not the fact that domestic outside 
savings is inadequate to provide the necessary savings for real fixed investment i.e. the 
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high costs associated with borrowing domestically reduce the expected returns on 
investment to a point where price of capital assets falls well below its potential.  Rather, 
if the expected returns on additional investment are low or nonexistent due to inadequate 
demand, then importing additional liquidity from financial liberalization will not spur 
investment either by lowering domestic money rate of rate of interest or from the ability 
to borrow at lower interest rates abroad.   
On the other hand, domestic banks would still like to exploit international interest 
rate differentials and their inability to lend to domestic businesses in such an environment 
will shift their lending from firms to households.  As domestic banks drop their margins 
of safety in an attempt to profit from borrowing low internationally and lending high 
domestically, consumers will find they can borrow at lower credit standards.  Foreign 
savings is initially used to finance domestic consumption by issuing credit.  Since the 
inflow of foreign savings puts upward pressure on the currency, demand will rise for the 
non-tradable segment of economy -- at the expense of hurting exports -- inflating 
domestic assets prices (i.e. real estate and equity markets).  A portion of household’s 
savings is diverted to household investment in dwelling houses.  A housing boom can 
materialize that stimulates other sectors of the economy such as construction and home 
furnishing.  The increase in demand from the influx in foreign savings can translate to 
higher expected returns for domestic firms as excess capacity falls and the marginal 
profitability of capital rises.  Eventually, an increase in retained earnings and a higher rate 
of profit will push firms to invest in real capital assets.  With countries that are initially 
investment constrained, higher consumption financed by financial liberalization increases 
the internal accumulation of firms leading to an increase in investment that can be 
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financed from retained earnings.  Real fixed investment does not have to increase the net 
gearing ratio of firms under this circumstance.  Therefore, it appears that the elasticity of 
outside savings is negative as dissavings supports economic development; however, this 
is merely an illusion! 
 Although the dissavings of individual consumers are financing additional 
consumption, it is the increase in foreign savings that is subsidizing the dissavings.  The 
economic boom rests on the shoulders of giant international institutions as pension fund 
managers become enamored with the higher rates of return in developing and emerging 
market economies.  The rise in domestic asset prices will encourage additional foreign 
investment and external capital flows will continue to rise.   
Of course, not all of the foreign savings will find its way to consumers pocket in 
the form of cheap credit -- only a fraction of the foreign savings that is flowing into the 
country will find its way to the domestic economy in the form of household dissavings or 
credit.  There is still a level of borrowers and lenders risk associated with even the most 
bullish economies determining a limit to the amount of consumption that can be financed 
by capital markets.  Furthermore, domestic firms will be competing with foreign 
producers to sell their products just as rising tide of external capital is appreciating the 
domestic currency.  Credit is often used to buy big-ticket and high tech imports -- both of 
which have a higher income elasticity of demand than manufactured goods and primary 
product produced at the periphery.  A portion of the increase in demand will be lost to 
foreign markets at the expense of the internal accumulation of domestic firms.   
Therefore, with capital market liberalization foreign-savings is likely to have a more 
elastic respond to changes in investment than internal accumulation.     
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Just as with the savings-constrained economy, foreign savings appears to be 
relatively elastic in an investment-constrained economy.  If foreign savings are relatively 
elastic, then their accumulation adjusts itself more readily than internal accumulation to a 
change of real capital accumulation.  Given the size of external capital flows to the 
domestic financial sector of developing economies, the massive inflow of foreign savings 
will raise the elasticity of total outside savings relative to firms’ saving.   
The rise or fall of the net gearing ratio, however, does seem to be associated with 
an economy that is predominately savings constrained versus investment constrained.  If 
a national economy is savings constrained, then it will utilize foreign savings to 
externally finance investment raising their net gearing ratio; conversely, if a national 
economy is investment constrained, then consumers will utilized foreign savings to 
finance their consumption spurring demand and leading to an increase in retained 
earnings effectively lowering the net gearing ratio.  Given the rate of external capital 
inflows, in the former the firm will absorb a large portion of foreign savings increasing 
the financial fragility of the firm in accordance with Minsky.  In the latter, firms will opt 
to use internal funds to finance investment leaving the capital market to absorb a large 
portion of foreign savings.  This aligns itself more with the principle of increasing risk 
associated with Kalecki.  Therefore, the factors limiting the expansion of firms are either 
domestic financial constraints such as underdeveloped capital market (i.e. a savings 
constrained economy) or the limitations of the domestic market (i.e. an investment 
constrained economy). 
Whether or not the domestic economy strongly relies on imports and/or -- in the 
case of weak domestic capital markets -- it is savings constrained or investment 
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constrained is of no importance to the relative elasticity of foreign savings.  Financial 
liberalization leaves the door open to all types of external capital flows and those flows 
are likely to push the elasticity of total outside to a point where internal accumulation 
adjusts itself less readily to a change in real fixed investment.  
The addition of foreign savings appears to support Minsky’s Financial Instability 
Hypothesis in that it raises the elasticity of total outside savings above the elasticity of 
internal accumulation with respect to a change in real capital accumulation.  In Minsky’s 
framework, there is now sufficient outside savings to support a rising gearing ratio 
without necessitating a rise in household savings.  If firms have the desire to speculate, 
they could increase the ratio of their debt to liquid assets in order to reap higher profits on 
equity without the undesirable consequences of a fall in consumer demand.  Essentially, 
with the addition of foreign savings to outside savings, euphoric sentiment could 
conceivably lead to speculative financing arrangements becoming the norm as theorized 
by Minsky.    
What does not fit, however, is Kalecki’s Principle of Increasing Risk.  The 
domestic capital market must find a way to absorb the inflow of foreign savings in such a 
way that it does not ostensibly increase the risk of the firm, but nonetheless pushes the 
economy toward greater financial fragility.  In order to see how this might come about, 
we must spend a bit of time discussing some of the fundamental differences between 






Section 2.02 Firm Size and the Distribution of Outside Savings Among Businesses 
Various firms run into a multitude of hurdles that limit their expansion, but as 
Kalecki (1971) explains the amount of entrepreneurial capital available to the firm can 
pose a significant financial barrier towards growth.  The more oligopolistic firms that 
possess the most amount of entrepreneurial capital will not face the same financial 
constraints as their smaller more competitive counterparts.  The relative size of firms and 
their market power will distribute the majority of aggregate firms’ savings to businesses 
that hold the greatest share of their respective markets.  Oligopolistic industries will be 
more resilient to changes in income because of their innate ability to influence the price 
(relative to their costs) and they have greater control over the level of capacity by limiting 
new entrants to the industry.  Thus at a given degree of utilization of capacity the 
oligopolistic industries have a tendency to see their marginal profits and internal 
accumulation rise relative to the more competitive industries.   
Steindl (1976, p. 124) finds that the growth of oligopoly in the modern economy 
creates a misdistribution of profits and business savings from the competitive industries 
to the oligopolistic ones.  If the rate of capital growth rises, then the more competitive 
industries will gain additional firms at the margin increasing the capital stock for the 
industry thus reducing the marginal rate profit and retained earnings.  This will result in a 
falling rate of profit for the competitive industries relative to the oligopolistic industries 
redistributing profits from the former to the later.  This underlines an important point 
with respect to the net gearing ratio between the various firms and industries within an 
economy.  If we assume the small to midsized firms make up the more competitive 
industries and largest firms make up the oligopolistic industries, then the net gearing ratio 
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for the smaller firms that make up the competitive industries must rise relative to the 
largest firms that make up oligopolistic industries with the redistribution of profits.  The 
equity of the latter is rising faster than the former to a given rise in the real capital stock.  
In fact, new entrants to the more competitive industries will increase the capital stock 
relative to the more oligopolistic industries since the influence on utilization of the latter 
would be proportionately smaller then the former for fear over capacity.  What we have is 
a rising proportion of real fixed capital to equity for the competitive industries in effect 
increasing the financial constraints on firms that are already likely to have little 
entrepreneurial capital.  Conversely, a falling proportion of real fixed capital to equity for 
the oligopolistic industry has the opposite effect of lowering the financial constraints on 
the largest firms in the economy.  It may well be that the only thing limiting the growth 
of the largest firms in the economy is domestic issues that affect the expected returns on 
their investment.   
The consequence of a rising net gearing ratio is an increase in the severity of a 
loss in the case of bad business ventures as well as a rising risk premium on external 
finance.  Therefore, the distribution of outside savings among firms of differing size and 
the financing constraints that influence their position seems pertinent to our discussion.   
 
(a) Small to Midsized Firms or More Competitive Industries 
Firm size has been commonly used to identify businesses that are savings 
constrained (see Schiantarelli (1995) for a survey).  It has been argued that relatively high 
informational asymmetries and low levels of entrepreneurial capital are to blame for 
greater financial constraints incurred by smaller firms.    The financial constraints facing 
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these firms are not only associated with a high (rising) net gearing ratio -- the proportion 
of capital to equity is likely to be uncomfortably high for most small businesses -- but 
their inability to access long-term capital markets necessitates a well functioning capital 
market in order to roll-over or refinance short-term liabilities.  This increases the costs of 
borrowing for small to mid-sized firms in the domestic economy acts as a barrier to their 
expansion. 
Moreover, capital market imperfections can raise the opportunity cost of external 
finance to a point where many smaller firms in the most competitive industries are 
eliminated from the capital market altogether.  Of the all the firms that make up the 
domestic economy nascent enterprises and small firms have the least amount of capital to 
provide as collateral for new loans.  The smallest firms that make up the most 
competitive industries in an economy encounter the lowest marginal profit rates that must 
translate to a small degree of internal accumulation.  These firms often times finance their 
economic activity from retained earnings or the entrepreneurs’ own resources since they 
do not possess the capital requirements to finance investment externally.  Any real 
expansion in business capital in the most competitive industries will likely come at the 
margin as changes in rate of profits lead to a rise or fall in the number of firms.   This 
environment where firms find themselves outside the ability to access their domestic 
capital markets all together seems to be related to the level of their domestic financial 
sector development.  Firms that reside in the least developed countries will be confronted 
with higher financial constraints than the firms from developed countries.  This suggests 
that the more backward the financial sector, the greater number of firms will be 
eliminated from the capital market translating to a slower rate of investment.    
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Inessa Love (2001) argues that the level of financial sector development of a 
country is related to the degree of financing constraints endured by firms seeking to 
externally finance investment.  She show that not only do smaller firms suffer 
disproportionately high financing constraints from their more monopolistic counterparts, 
but also the level of financial sector development can exacerbate the problem when the 
capital market imperfections are particularly severe.  In a similar study, Kumar, Rajan 
and Zingales (1999) find that the average size of firms in industries dependent on external 
finance is larger in countries with better financial markets, suggesting that financial 
constraints limit average firm size.  
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) examined the financing constraints of 
corporate investment in relation to the firm size.  Their conclusion shows that financial 
factors affect investment since imperfect capital markets create an environment where 
opportunity cost of internal finance can be considerably lower than external finance.  
Small-to-mid sized firms who absorb a lesser portion of the aggregate profits in society 
are more prone to exhaust low-cost internal finance increasing the risk to adverse 
movements to their income cash flows.  External finance can replace internal finance, 
albeit the two are not perfect substitutes; capital market imperfections lead to differing 
financial constraints that permeate the risk profiles of smaller firms at a considerable cost 
disadvantage.  For many of these firms, there is essentially no low-cost alternative to 
investment finance that can supplement their investment demand.   
If financial liberalization can improve the financial sector development of a 
country, then the opportunity cost of external finance will fall and more firms will gain 
access to local capital markets.  To some degree, lower financing constraints can spur 
	  
48	  
new investment in start-up companies and increase the level of fixed business investment 
of existing firms.  That is, access to foreign financial markets enables the smaller firms to 
absorb a proportion of total outside savings as fixed business investment in new 
enterprise or as a source for additional investment to an existing enterprise.  Therefore, 
some small to midsized firms that suffered from savings constraints can benefit from 
liberalized capital markets if they wish to grow their company via external finance.   
 Of course this scenario seems most plausible during an economic boom period 
where margins of safety dropped for both lenders and borrowers.  For domestic lenders, 
the combination of a fall in international lending standards, rising international interest 
rate spreads and increased competition from foreign lenders can lead them to lower their 
margins of safety and engage in more risky business.  This can increase the elasticity of 
the local supply of credit to domestic firms.  Domestic borrowers, such as small to 
midsized businesses, lacking the appropriate reserves to internally finance investment 
might opt for external finance.  Since small and midsized businesses absorb a lesser 
portion of the aggregate profits compared to their larger more monopolistic competitors, 
building the required excess reserves to internally finance their demand for fixed capital 
assets might be out of reach (especially those projects that have long gestation periods or 
investment in large machinery and equipment).  Issuing financial liabilities during a 
speculative boom not only leaves the door open for additional investment via external 
finance, but it offers additional profit opportunities on the rolling over or refinancing of 
past liabilities.  In this scenario the smaller firms’ success may vary well breed 




(b) Large Firms or More Oligopolistic Industries 
Inadequate demand associated with the limitations of the domestic market act as a 
governor on the rate of real capital expansion for large firms.  Market friendly economic 
policy alleviates some of this concern by further integrating the domestic economy into 
the international community providing alternative markets for the larger firms to expand.  
In addition, financial liberalization eases credit markets for households thus financing a 
surge in domestic demand.  This paves the way for the more oligopolistic industries to 
increase their demand for real capital assets in accordance with a desired level of capacity 
utilization.  In contrast to the more competitive industries, the oligopolistic industries 
have more entrepreneurial capital to internally finance investment demand.  As the 
capital  accumulation begins to arise out of firms’ savings a rising rate of profit will 
motivate additional accumulation.  Investment financed from retained earnings avoids the 
additional borrowing cost (increasing risk) associated with limited capital markets.  
Hence the capital expansion of the oligopolistic sector not only experiences a rise in real 
fixed capital financed out of savings or profits, but the rise in capital increases the 
borrowing capacity for the industry as a whole.   
The larger firms have considerable more capital than their smaller competitors 
giving them much greater access to the domestic capital markets.  Their ability to use 
outside savings rises with the amount of entrepreneurial capital the firm possesses; the 
greater the internal accumulation of a firm the lower the net gearing ratio and perceived 
risk of the firm.  This allows for new loans with lower interest rates decreasing the 
balance sheet cash flows on the existing liabilities.  Moreoever, large firms have greater 
access to bond markets and long-term debt markets to finance investment.  Their ability 
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to utilize long-term capital markets to finance investment eliminates the higher borrowing 
costs of short-term finance such as the uncertainty associated with necessitating the 
constant rolling over or refinancing of liabilities.   
The question remains, however, if the large inflows of foreign savings can be 
absorbed into the domestic economy by the means thus stated.  Does household demand 
aided by debt financed consumption for housing and other big ticket items spur enough 
external finance by the domestic industries to justify an increase in real fixed investment 
ample enough absorb a rising tide of foreign savings?   
Depending on the financial sector development of a national economy, it seems 
perfectly plausible that a certain percentage small to midsized firms will expand with 
outside savings accumulating at a greater proportionate rate than internal accumulation.  
The net gearing ratio is rising with additional real capital accumulation consistent with 
elastic outside savings.  However, the ability for any of these firms to absorb even a 
fraction of the massive external capital inflows is improbable (or maybe even impossible 
for those countries with high import coefficients and/or underdeveloped capital markets).  
This is exacerbated with the inability for many of smallest firms (those at the margins of 
society) to receive any type of financing whatsoever.    
Thus, the largest firms would have to absorb a (large) majority of the external 
capital flows, but as I previously pointed out this is not going to happen under the current 
circumstances.  Household financed consumption will absorb some of the external capital 
inflows and increase domestic demand in the none tradable sector of the economy; 
however, an appreciating currency will negatively effect the trade balance and fear of 
over-capacity will create a drag on investment.   Most importantly, large firms will try to 
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maintain a constant net gearing ratio or even actively try to reduce it during an economic 
boom.  This implies that the use of outside savings is inelastic for the most dominant 
firms in the economy.  Of course this cannot be with the massive inflow of foreign 
savings.  This brings us to the most important feature of the large firms, their ability to 
issue shares in a domestic equity market. 
Joint-stock companies or corporations can use domestic equity markets to 
augment their entrepreneurial capital.  Of the total entrepreneurial capital at the disposal 
of firms to finance investment, share capital has a peculiar quality in that it draws on 
total outside savings much like issuing additional liabilities for external finance, but it 
does so without increasing the net gearing ratio of the firm.  The domestic equity markets 
provide an avenue by which an influx of foreign savings can be absorbed by the domestic 
economy without impeding upon the desired risk profile of the largest firms.  To borrow 
a phrase from Joseph Steindl, “[the joint stock system or equity markets] merge a certain 
amount of outside saving into equity” (Steindl, 1976, p. 138).  The ability to issue new 
shares bypasses the contradictions of increasing risk with an elastic total outside savings 
as a large proportion of the external capital inflows transforms into equity.  The largest 
firms in the domestic economy can issue new shares to increase entrepreneurial capital 
and finance investment without increasing its ratio of debt to equity thereby avoiding the 
debt trap of smaller to midsized firms.  What remains to be determined is the size and 
frequency of new share issues by corporations. 
For equity finance there seems to be no limit to the amount of shares a Joint-stock 
company wishes to issue.  This statement, however, is shortsighted as Kalecki (1971) 
points out in his essay on entrepreneurial capital.  There are indeed a number of factors 
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restricting the issuance of new shares to finance investment.  First, the risk exposure to 
the majority shareholders is amplified by the necessity for new investment expenditure 
financed by equity markets to at least equal the old rate of profits.  If the new issue of 
shares does not increase retained earnings proportionately to the increase in share and 
reserve capital, then dividends are at risk of being ‘squeezed’ or suspended.  The 
increasing risk associated with this scenario is apparent in the adverse reaction by the 
market to changes in dividend payouts that translates to a sharp decline in equity prices.  
Second, the market for new issues is limited to an extent by the size of the market.  For 
example, equity markets in emerging and developing markets are much thinner than 
those of the developed world, thus there is maximum amount of new shares that can be 
issued to the public that would make a new issue of shares profitable to majority 
shareholders.   The ‘old guard’ will not welcome a new-issue that lowers the share price 
to a level not consistent with meeting the annual dividend payout for reasons stated 
above.  Lastly, the distribution of control between the majority shareholders and the 
public with any new issuance is undeniably affected as the old guard’s influence is 
watered-down.   
Of the factors limiting the issue of new shares the most significant is undoubtedly 
the size of the market.  If the state of the equity market provides the appropriate price to 
be obtained by a new share issue, then joint-stock companies will find it profitable to 
increase the number of claims on the firm.  In other words, a firm will issue new shares 
when the increase in profits is proportionately greater than the increase in claims.  This 
suggests that the marginal rate of profit will be closely related to the earnings yield on the 
new share issue.  That is, the marginal rate of profit from the new investment resulting 
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from a new share issue must be greater than earnings yield of the shares plus the cost of 
the issue.  In order to fully understand what determines a new share issue, we must delve 
a bit deeper into the meaning and determinants of the earnings yield.  
The earnings yield is simply the inverse of the price to earnings ratio.  It is the 
ratio of the earnings per share to its market value per share.  The earnings per share are 
the proportion of net income less dividends (diminished by the amount of outstanding 
debt) to the average outstanding shares.  The market value of shares is simply the current 
price for the shares ruling in the market.   Therefore, the earnings yield is simply the rate 
of profit on the average outstanding shares divided by the price of the share.  It follows 
that this ratio will rise with either an increase in the earnings per share or a fall in the 
market price of the shares or both.  Conversely, the earnings yield will fall with either a 
decrease in the earnings per share or a rise in the in the market price of the shares or both.  
The firm will issue new shares if the marginal rate of profit (expected earnings) is 
proportionately greater than the earnings yield.  To put it another way, if the earnings 
yield falls by a certain amount, then the price to earnings ratio will raise by the same 
amount (since it is simply its inverse).  When there is a sharp rise in the price to earnings 
ratio relative to the marginal rate of profit, then the firm will be tempted to issue new 
shares. 
Let us examine how the beginnings of an economic boom can spur a rise in the 
issuance of new shares by firms in the absence of financial liberalization.   For simplicity 
let’s abbreviate the earnings yield as E/P, where E = earnings per share and P = market 
price of the shares.  The marginal rate of profit or expected earnings will be abbreviated 
as Π.  A firm will decide to issue new shares when E/P < Π.  It can be realistically 
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assumed that if E rises then P will rise as well.  The rise in P will be determined by the 
psychological state of market.  During bullish times P will rise with more vigor than 
during bearish times.  In fact, if the state of the market is extremely bearish, P can fall 
with a rise in E, but let’s assume that the current sentiment is somewhat bullish since we 
are beginning this thought experiment at the beginning of a boom period. 
 If E increases, then Π is increasing since decisions to invest are largely 
determined by the current internal accumulation of capital by the firm.  When the 
accumulation of entrepreneurial capital (retained earnings plus share capital) is rising, 
then investment will increase.  In addition, if Π is rising overtime, then in the period of 
time considered investment will have an additional stimulus as new investment projects 
are expected to become profitable.  Thus, an increase in total savings of a firm and a rise 
in expected profits with respect to time will extend the boundaries set to investment by a 
limited capital market and increasing risk; however, the extension of the boundary 
determining the level of new investment is muted by the degree of utilization associated 
with an increase in the stock of capital. 
 Therefore, in the beginning of an economic boom E, P and Π can all be expected 
to rise.  A rise in E will increase the ratio E/P deterring new share issues from the firm, 
but the corresponding rise in P associated with higher earnings from the firm will dampen 
this effect or maybe even reverse it (if the rise in P is greater than E the ratio E/P will fall 
with respect to Π).   Thus, during a boom period it can be expected that even if E/P is 
rising, the rise in P will slow the rise relative to Π; that is, the proportionate rise in E/P is 
less than the rise in Π.  Once Π increases to the point where it is greater than E/P by a 
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proportion corresponding to the cost of the yield, the firm will find it advantageous to 
issue new shares.     
So how do liberalized capital markets and the surge in external capital flows 
affect the earnings yield?  
As foreign savings responds elastically to the economic boom, the surge in 
external capital flows will need to find an outlet with which it can be absorbed into the 
domestic economy.  The foreign savings that is not absorbed into the financial structure 
of the domestic households and firms will be merged into equity rapidly increasing the 
market price of shares.  The surge in external capital will create a stock market boom that 
will dramatically lower the earnings yield -- the rise in P is proportionately greater than 
the rise in E -- the result of which is a tendency for domestic corporations to issue new 
shares.  Hence, there is a shift in the domestic economy toward financialization. The 
proportion of nominal share capital to the replacement value of the existing capital assets 
of the joint-stock companies will rise.  This ratio, essentially the inverse of the earnings 
per share, is the degree of capitalization of the firm.  It follows that a surge in external 
capital or foreign savings initiates a period of capital market inflation expanding the 
equity market incentivizing joint-stock companies to issue shares in excess of the cost of 
fixed capital assets resulting in a period of over-capitalization.    
Jan Toporowski (2000, 2005, 2009) has developed a theory of Capital Market 
Inflation.  He believes that in financially developed capitalist economies the issuance of 
capital market liabilities is not necessarily determined by a demand for fixed capital 
investment, but rather it is determined by an increase in demand for financial assets.  The 
increase in demand for financial assets is the desire of firms to replenish their internal 
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liquidity.  Since fixed capital investment creates a legacy of debt obligation that must be 
met by future income cash flows, the opportunity cost for increasing fixed capital 
investment via debt finance is trumped by maintaining an ample supply of liquid reserves 
via financialization.  Issuing shares in excess of what is necessary to meet the cost of 
fixed capital investment can ameliorate this uncertainty.  Toporwoski explains,  
if firms do not have sufficient investment projects to absorb the finance that 
financial investors offer them, then rising securities prices will eventually induce 
companies to issue new securities (Toporwoski, 2005, p. 126). 
  
During a period of financial asset inflation, the rising proceeds from these additional 
securities can be used to either pay back outstanding liabilities or increase portfolio cash 
flows by buying up securities in the equity market.     
In the former, companies find it advantageous to reduce their balance sheet cash 
flows and payoff existing debt liabilities by raising money through financial markets 
rather than banks.  This gives the impression of an immediate improvement in 
profitability by substituting the carrying cost of debt obligations for an increase in 
portfolio cash flows where dividends payments are not recognized as an expense.  The 
joint-stock companies are actively managing their net gearing ratio to lower their 
perceived risk to investors.  More importantly, however, financial market inflation can 
give rise to perceived increases in profitability by the purchase and sale of financial assets 
without any real increases to neither productivity nor tangible assets. 
So long as the equity markets maintain their bullish behavior, entrepreneurial 
capital will be unaffected by the increase in dividend payouts due to the rise in portfolio 
cash flows.  In such an environment, the trade-off of issuing new securities to decrease 
interest payments has the immediate affect of increasing pre-tax profits resulting in a 
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positive feedback loop on its stock price.  The source of the added profitability, however, 
comes from the manipulation of the various cash flows mechanisms of the company: 
capital gains replace retained earnings; financial investment replaces fixed capital 
investment; and financialization replaces expanding the productive capacity of the 
company.  
 Thus, Jan Toporowski’s theory of capital asset inflation underlines an important 
characteristic of modern capitalist development.  An elastic total outside savings creates 
windfall capital gains for large domestic companies by inflating equity markets that 
incentivize their increase in portfolio transactions (i.e. buying and selling of financial 
assets).  A reduction in real fixed investment from crucial areas such as innovation and 
productivity can slow real capital accumulation.  A falling rate of profit will eventually 
move an economy to a more vulnerable state.  Financialization appears to increase 
financial instability in much the same way as Minsky theorized.    
 
Section 2.03 Financialization and Financial Instability 
As the boom period matures the demand for real fixed investment will come 
under increasing downward pressure from the rising stock of capital and financialization.  
There is a desire for oligopolistic firms to control the level of utilization leading to a 
lower level of investment for fear of over-capacity.  So as firms redirect a percentage of 
their resources from increasing the real capital stock to financialization, the proportion of 
retained earnings in total entrepreneurial capital (internal accumulation plus share capital) 
will fall overtime.  It follows that the marginal rate of profit in future periods will reflect 
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the downward pressure on the level of fixed business investment by increasing at a 
decreasing rate. 
To reiterate the dangers associated with excess capacity, a sharp rise in the capital 
stock can have devastating repercussion on the marginal profitability of capital.  It is in 
the interest of oligopolistic industries to actively manage a planned degree of utilization 
in order to insure against undesired excess capacity.  For fear of an unexpected fall in the 
rate of utilization, the largest companies that make up the oligopolistic industries will 
lower the influence of utilization on investment when rate of profit is increasing.  This 
means that as capital becomes increasingly scarce during an economic boom the dangers 
of creating excess capacity will act as a drag on level of real fixed investment.  The lower 
influence of utilization from joint-stock companies on investment redirects resources to 
be invested in financial assets.  So it follows that the rate of profit will have a tendency to 
fall overtime.   
A fall in the marginal rate of profit in modern capitalist development does not 
necessarily mean that new share issues will cease or fall to a trickle since the earnings 
yield also has a tendency to fall particularly when market sentiment is positive.  We have 
learned that when bullish behavior pervades the equity market it is likely that the earnings 
yield will fall at a greater proportionate rate than the marginal rate of profit.   
A fall in the earnings yield need not solely rely on exogenous short-term demand 
conditions fueled by irrational speculation at home or from abroad.  There also seems to 
be an endogenous decline in the earnings yield over time as profit opportunities motivate 
a repositioning of firms in order to exploit greater capital gains.  Financialization offers 
an alternative outlet to earn capital gains without tying up resources in the less liquid real 
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capital assets that endogenously acts to lower the average earnings yield effectively 
widening the equity market as new shares issues rise.   
Two short examples can demonstrate how joint-stock companies can purchase the 
stock of other companies or reshuffle their financial assets in order to increase the 
perceived profitability of the corporation without increasing the level of fixed business 
investment.  First, Kalecki (1971) and Steindl (1976) shows how holding companies are 
nothing more than another way for large shareholders in joint-stock companies to avoid 
the limitations associated with issuing new shares.  So long as there is not a collapse in 
the domestic equity markets, the old guard of majority shareholders (with their holdings 
consisting of at least 51%) can use the creation of a holding company to issue new shares 
without watering down their influence.  Essentially, a new company is created to hold 
their majority shares.  The group can then keep a majority standing in the new company 
and sell up to 49% of their shares to the public.  In the end, the old guard can maintain a 
majority share of a new company through refinancing their portfolio cash flows at 26% of 
the capital of old company, with the ability to spend 25% in cash to invest a in new share 
issue of the old company.  It offers additional resources to be reinvested into the business 
without the increasing risk associated with new share issue.  It reduces the risk associated 
with meeting existing dividend payments as well as inflates the capital market for shares 
in the company since its influence on the equity market as a whole expands with its 
relative size.   
Second, Toporowski (2000) explains that merger and acquisition activity or 
management buy-outs offer the acquiring company the option to use its own share issue 
to reduce financial liabilities of the company being acquired, thus lowering its balance 
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sheet cash flows by reducing the interest payments and improving the operating profits of 
the acquired company.  Of course, the perceived increase in the profitability of the 
acquired company has nothing to do with increased productivity, innovation or superior 
management technique.  This is simply a reorganization of the financial assets and 
liabilities of the two companies.  The financial assets of the acquiring company lower the 
net gearing ratio of the acquired company.  Just as with the creation of the holding 
company, there is a fall in the average earnings yield associated with the drive for joint 
stock companies to earn capital gains through equity market activity.   
The equity markets in itself are a vehicle for funding merger and acquisition 
activity.  The firm that initiates the corporate takeover will purchase the smaller company 
at a premium using money that has been financed with a new share issue.  In the case of a 
stock market boom being financed by the inflow of foreign savings, the foreign investors 
are essentially financing the corporate takeover in such a way that newly raised money is 
used to pay off the old shareholders at premium.  This sounds awfully familiar to the 
Ponzi schemes made infamous by the likes of Charles Ponzi and Bernard Madoff; where 
new deposits are used to payoff old depositors at a premium. 
Out of the complexities of the financial sector something begins to materialize 
from equity market that is much like the speculative or Ponzi finance that necessitates the 
small to midsized firms to rollover or refinance their debt.  Joint-stock companies must 
rely on the state of the equity market to constantly ‘rollover’ their securities.  Since a 
share never really matures in the same sense as a bond, the liquidity and profit structure 
of the equity market must necessitate the constant reinvestment into new shares.  In 
essence, the market must be willing to constantly rollover the shares in the domestic 
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stock market in order for it function properly.   In the case of developing economies, 
financial liberalization allows for foreign savings to be merged into equity and the rise in 
share capital funds a boom in financial and productive investments.  But when foreign 
savings dries up in the case of speculative attack, then the state of market will be such 
that there will be no one willing to buy securities.  Therefore the equity markets behave 
like the Ponzi financial arrangements proposed by Minsky, however at a much larger 
scale.   
Financial instability lurks below the surface as the ratio of all capital market and 
bank liabilities to liquid assets increases while the ratio of debt to liquid assets remains 
constant or falling.  This is an important point that Toporowski acknowledges in The End 
of Finance, “[Minsky’s] hypothesis may still be valid if equity is regarded like debt as a 
liability of firms.  In effect, equity finance is not a substitute for internal finance because 
it is a capital market liability rather than a liquid asset” (Toporowski, 2000, p. 27).  It is 
not merely the proportion of business capital to equity or the net gearing ratio that should 
concern a firm, but rather the proportion of a company’s total assets to equity or gross 
gearing ratio.  When we take into account debt plus all inter-indebtedness of firms, 
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis comes to surface just as he predicted.  
As a result, financialization squeezes the internal accumulation of firms 
increasing their reliance on the inflow of foreign savings to maintain a constant net 
gearings ratio.  The rising proportion of share capital to entrepreneurial capital imposes 
on the firm the perpetual marketability of its securities to the wider public both foreign 
and domestic.  Demand for its securities must persist in order for the potential sellers of 
the security to earn a profit.  If the price of securities plummets on a collapse of demand 
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for equities, then the sale of a security may only come at a considerable loss.  The fall in 
the market price for equities will rise the earnings yield on securities and the rate of new 
stock issues will flat-line or begin to fall.  The liquidity that initiated the boom in 
financial investments is ephemeral as foreign savings evaporates from the domestic 
financial markets.  The fall in share capital will raise the net gearing ratio since the fall in 
equity prices lowers total entrepreneurial capital relative to existing liabilities.  Demand 
for capital assets will fall as firms begin to try to stabilize their net gearings ratio.   
Herein is where lies the peculiar nature of foreign savings.  During an economic 
boom it act to raise the inflow of total outside savings and as growth slows it perpetuates 
the opposite effect by lowering the inflow of outside savings.  As an inflow it plays an 
active role as it boost the elasticity of total outside savings to a point where it 
accumulates more readily than internal accumulation to a change in real fixed investment.  
The Minsky process can proceed without necessitating a rising in the net gearing ratio for 
the economy as foreign savings finds its way in to the local market by merging itself into 
equity.  Joint stock companies can then use the new share capital financed by foreign 
savings for investment rather than issuing debt.  Foreign savings enters the domestic 
economy as if it were being generated domestically like household savings as it finds its 
way in the domestic market as external finance or share capital.   
But during a period of economic decline foreign savings disappears or evaporates 
from the local economy leading to rising ratio of inelastic domestic outside savings to 
total outside savings.  Domestic interest rates will rise in order to slow the outflow of 
foreign capital, but that only acts to decrease the marginal profitability of capital even 
further and the rate of real capital growth will continue to fall.  Companies will begin 
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deleveraging as business savings begins to fall proportionately greater than outside 
savings and the demand price of capital assets will collapse.  What follows is a period of 
forced indebtedness or debt deflation that requires government deficit spending and/or 
currency depreciation to correct the rising disequilibrium.  When the proportion of 
business savings is falling faster than total outside savings, then budget spending can 
offset the fall in business savings by replacing inadequate household spending or 
dissavings.  In a flexible currency market the evaporation of foreign savings will 
depreciate the local currency, increase exports and lower the deficit in foreign balances.  
The government and foreign sectors of the economy can act as a buffer against a rising 
proportion of domestic outside savings to foreign savings.  Without the built in stabilizer 
the economic situation is likely to become much worse as the inelasticity of outside 
savings forces the national economy into a self-perpetuating vicious circle of economic 
stagnation.  
Competition-coerced profit-seeking by various financial units, the euphoric 
sentiment associated with the rapid rise in asset markets and equities, and an 
overwhelming flow of short-term capital from abroad has advanced the capital 
development of an open economy teetering atop a bubble of financial-asset and -liability 
speculation.  The situation becomes sustainable only on an ever-increasing flow of 
foreign savings in order to perpetuate a continual rolling over of shares in the domestic 
stock market.  On the event that investor confidence turns to a more pessimistic outlook 
of the domestic economy, capital inflows can slow or even reverse leading to widespread 
macroeconomic problems.  Therefore, efforts by local authorities must act to maintain a 




 The role of total outside savings has on the financialization of business disguises 
the financial instability of a national economy.  Foreign savings increases the elasticity of 
outside savings to a point that satisfies the crucial Minskyan assumption that during an 
economic boom the accumulation of total capital market liabilities must rise 
proportionately faster than equity.  The common misinterpretation of Minsky that 
generates the crux of the criticism from economists is the role equity markets play in 
absorbing an elastic outside savings as share capital begins to rise proportionately faster 
than retained earnings.  Share capital is often times mislabeled as a capital market asset 
when in fact it should be considered a capital market liability.  This misconception of 
share capital as a capital market asset is buttressed in its definition as a proportion of total 
entrepreneurial capital.  This allows for the financial robustness of a national economy to 
be overstated as financialization understates the leverage ratio for the national economy.  
Ignoring the inter-indebtedness of businesses can result in constant or falling net gearing 
ratio when in fact the gross gearing ratio is rising.   
Examining the peculiar nature of foreign savings removes the shibboleth that 
shrouds the endogenous rise in financing fragility.  What becomes apparent is the 
tendency for financialization to become a tour de force of financial capitalism.  
Extraordinarily high profits realized through capital gains allows for an unprecedented 
amount of leveraging of assets and risk taking while the financial stability of the national 
economy becomes increasingly reliant on the state of the equity market to constantly 
‘rollover’ their securities.  Joint stock companies look to equity markets to diversify their 
portfolios in an attempt to hedge risk, but their demand for financial investment redirects 
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capital from real fixed investment.  Retained earnings become squeezed by share capital 
and the marginal rate of profit will begin to fall.   
It appears as though both Minsky and Kalecki are essentially saying the same 
thing from two distinct perspectives.  For Minsky, firms increase their capital market 
liabilities in order to reap greater profits either by issuing more debt to make on the carry 
or by issuing more share capital to earn capital gains.  In fact the later can be used to 
justify the former when a rise in the share capital lowers the net gearing ratio effectively 
expanding the firms ability to take on more debt.  For Kalecki, when the state of the 
market increases the incentive to issue new shares, there is a period when expanding the 
share capital of a firm looks less risky than issuing debt since the former increases the 
total entrepreneurial capital of the firm.  In similar fashion to retained earnings, share 
capital can expand the ability to issue debt without increasing the net gearing ratio of the 
firm.  Capital gains provide profit opportunities without the dangers of unexpected excess 
capacity; however, a fall in real fixed investment will decrease the marginal rate of profit 
in future periods.  There is a parallel between the two theories, only that the approach to 
explain endogenous business cycle theory comes from two different perspectives; that is, 
from the Financial Instability Hypothesis and the Principle of Increasing Risk and 
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